Rethinking the US-Saudi Relationship in the Name of Regional Security

Saudi Arabia has long been a staunch United States ally in the Middle East. Although the two countries values are fundamentally at odds, the US has looked past their differences in the name of energy and regional stability. However, the time may have come for a change in this relationship. Saudi policies aimed at checking Iranian influence have made the kingdom a hindrance to regional stability. By funding and training extremist militias bound for Syria, offering aide to a military autocracy in Egypt, and arguing against the Iranian nuclear agreement, not to mention the grievous human rights violations against its own citizens and those in neighboring Bahrain, Saudi Arabia pushes a volatile region away from peace and long term stability. American support grants a degree of legitimacy and security to the al-Saud regime, thereby giving its actions tacit US support. As shale and other alternative fuels become more prominent in the global market, and US foreign policy begins to pivot towards Asia, the time has come to alter current Middle Eastern alliances. If the US is serious about bringing long-term peace and stability in the region, it must begin to rethink its relationship with one of its oldest allies in the Middle East.

Civil war in Syria served as a proxy battleground for Saudi Arabia and Iran. Claiming to support the rebels because they fight against a brutal dictator, Saudi Arabia has publically supported and funded many rebel groups, including those with ties to terrorist organizations such as Jabhat al-Nusra, and the Islamic State of Iraq. Funding, arming, and training these extremist groups intensifies the violence within Syria. It also reduces the possibility of a moderate Syria after the revolution, as well-armed extremist groups quickly take the place of moderate militias. These groups will not be contained within Syria’s borders, but will spread violence and extremist throughout the region, and possibly the world. The regime’s support of such terrorist organizations is unacceptable and endangers international security.

After the June 30^th revolution in Egypt, when the US threatened to end its aid to the Egyptian military, Saudi Arabia offered to more than make up for the loss. The $12billion aide package was an effort to curb the influence of the Muslim Brotherhood, who challenges domestic Saudi hegemony, and to gain another friend in the region. Their actions reduced US influence and supported a military government that shows no signs of relinquishing their power to the people. This money has financed a military regime in Egypt responsible for violating basic human rights and killing hundreds of its own citizens engaged in peaceful protest. Military rule has also caused a flare up of violence in the Sinai, threatening the tenuous relations between Egypt, Israel, and Hamas. Saudi Arabia is supporting a regime that endangers both domestic and international stability.

The recent nuclear agreement reached between the P5+1 and Iran is obviously threatening to Saudi interests. If sanctions are permanently lifted on Iran, they will begin selling oil to the global market, threatening Saudi Arabia’s own share in the market. Saudi Arabia has employment estimated at anywhere from ten to thirty percent, and no other developed sectors of the economy other than oil and banking. Without a steady influx of petro-dollars, the Saudi government would be unable to continue its generous program of subsidies that form the basis of the government’s legitimacy. Economic competition could prove disastrous for the Saudi economy, and therefore its political stability. Iran also poses a geo-strategic threat. Iran’s influence can be strongly felt in Lebanon, Iraq, and Syria, and with the new promise of US and European friendship, they seem to have many more friends than Saudi Arabia. Perhaps most importantly, Saudi Arabia fears that a rise in Iranian power will encourage rebellion amongst its own Shia population. Long oppressed and marginalized by Riyadh, Shias in the Eastern Province have been a source of unrest, challenging the Saudi royal family. If encouraged by Iran, they could be a serious problem for Saudi economic and political interests.

Although it is understandable, Saudi attempts to block this deal show them to place their own narrow interests above regional security. Tensions over Iran’s nuclear program are at an all-time high, with Israel threatening unilateral action that would surely thrust the region, and perhaps the entire world, into conflict. Opposing diplomatic progress, halting the regulation of nuclear cites, and even threatening to obtain their own nuclear weapon are not the action a true friend to the US or to the region as a whole. The threat of nuclear war is too serious a topic to be used as a political tool.

Shias within Saudi Arabia have been victims of persecution and oppression since the country’s formation. Although they inhabit the most resource rich area of the country, they suffer from inadequate access to resources, economic opportunity, and basic freedoms. Saudi Arabia has also helped its neighbor, Bahrain, brutally repress Shia uprisings in the name of regional stability and countering Iran. Their blatant disregard for basic rights and human life indicate the lengths the al-Saud family will go to crush any challenger.

Saudi Arabia’s domestic and regional politics show that it has no interest in peace or conflict resolution, let alone democracy and human rights. Instead, its actions are simply calculated to preserve the al-Saud’s influence both within its own borders and throughout the region. In an effort to challenge Iran, Saudi Arabia spreads repression, weapons, and dangerous ideology, escalating conflicts and funding destabilizing groups. If the US is serious about long-term peace and stability in the region, it can no longer support the Saudi regime that brutally oppresses its own people, funds military rule and terrorist militias, and threatens nuclear conflict.

Sofi Smith

Do Muslim Women Need Saving?

“A moral crusade to rescue oppressed Muslim women from their cultures and their religion has swept the public sphere, dissolving distinctions between conservatives and liberals, sexists and feminists. The crusade has justified all manner of intervention from the legal to the military, the humanitarian to the sartorial. But it has also reduced Muslim women to a stereotyped singularity, plastering a handy cultural icon over much more complicated historical and political dynamics.”

So begins Lila Abu-Lughod’s recent article in Time, attacking the Western push for women’s liberation in the Middle East. Read it. She makes some important points about multi-culturalism, human rights as a shield for intervention, and generally a lack of nuance in the way the west view Muslim women.

There can be no doubt that most media coverage of the Middle East and Islam is essentialist, over simplified, and often time just plain incorrect. Little time is taken either by producers or consumers of this information to truly understand the complex history and multitude of political, social, and economic dynamics at play in contemporary Middle East. One must look no further than the violence and chaos in Iraq to see the real life implications of such a simplistic approach. There is always room for deeper understanding, a more complete picture, and a basic understanding that the people in the Middle East are no less real, human, and complex than those in the West.

However, the problem with Abu-Lughod’s article is that in attempting to bring this point she ignores the suffering that many Muslim women, and women of all creeds, face in the Middle East. In Yemen, women are counted as only half a witness in court, nor can they leave the house without their male guardian’s permission. In Morocco, charges are dropped against a rapist if he agrees to marry his victim. In Saudi Arabia, survivors of rape can legally be punished, sometimes more severely than their rapist. Women cannot yet vote. Women cannot drive. In Jordan, there are on average 20 honor killings per year.

Regardless of the formal legal status, female genital mutilation is widely practice. An estimated 91% of Egyptian women, 38% of Yemeni women, 8% of Iraqi women (although that number increases to up to nearly 60% in Kurdish regions),  and it is reported in Oman, UAE, Palestine, Syria, Iran, and Turkey.

Abu-Lughod mentions education, stating that education rates in Pakistan, Egypt, and Iran are relatively equal, with women even ahead in some places. Why then do women make up only a fraction of the work force and governing bodies?

There is social, economic, and political inequality in nearly all Middle Eastern countries (widening the lens to all Muslim countries continues this trend), some of it institutionalized and some cultural. And call it cultural imperialism if you will, but I see a problem with that. When women are not free to participate in the political, and economic systems, when they cannot even move freely about their neighborhoods, when they are subject to violence, mutilation, and fear, I see that as a problem.  To deny this is to say that women do not have the same value as men, or that these practices are morally acceptable, it is to descend into moral relativism and deny any sense of shared humanity.

Abu-Lughod is right to remind people not to judge too quickly, not to make assumptions based on religion and culture, nor to stop understanding their own choices as products of their own cultures. Wearing a hijab doesn’t make a woman oppressed, nor does being Muslim make a man an uneducated misogynist. Stripping a woman of any form of agency and enforcing a dress code does not bring true change. It is not the place of the west to ‘fix’ the rest of the world, or to use a language of rights for military intervention. But let’s not allow a quest for cultural acceptance to be blind to injustice. Do Muslim women need saving? Look at those numbers again and ask yourself.

Sofia Smith

A Note on Future Revolutions

Three renowned political science professors, Jason Brownlee of University of Texas, Tarek Masoud of Harvard, and Andrew Reynolds of UNC recently wrote an article for the Journal of Democracy and Washington Post that can be found here. It’s a worthwhile read on why the so-called Arab Spring produced so few regime changes. They conclude that the staying power of regimes was determined by some combination of oil revenues and hereditary rule. Oil has long been cited, as it gives the regime the wealth to contain challenges through force or bribes while hereditary rule accounts for heightened loyalty of security forces and the presence of ‘deep state’ institutions (See also deep state in Egypt and Turkey). Essentially, the political and economic culture of the dictatorship has become so entrenched in everyday life that even with the removal of the dictator personally, the system would remain. Therefore, a state that enjoys both of these factors (or one factor, in addition to foreign support) has a good chance of weathering the storms of public protest. From this, they challenge the idea that, “It is only a matter of time before the doleful dynastic stability of Jordan, Morocco, and Saudi Arabia gives way to popular demands for dignity and freedom… These sobering predictions are a useful corrective to the sunny optimism that the Arab Spring initially inspired.” It’s a well-argued and researched piece that offers a refreshing change of analysis from the traditional focus on social media and military loyalty. However, I must admit that my own “sunny optimism” has not been entirely stamped out.

My hope for democratization in the Middle East stems, from all places, Machiavelli. He argues in The Prince that a ruler must be wary of a society that has tasted freedom, for it will never fully submit to oppression again. The political landscape of the Middle East was changed forever in 2010 and no regime, regardless of its wealth or history, can afford to govern the way they did before. However, as the violence in Egypt, Syria show there are better methods of revolution. Erica Chenoweth articulates here the different methods of toppling an autocrat and historical pitfalls to avoid. Also of note is George Lawson’s theoretical framework for negotiated revolutions. He argues against a violent revolt of the mob based on utopian ideals. Instead, revolutionaries should aim to enter the system of liberal democracies through nonviolent protest, forcing the old regime to hand over power with the state still in tact. From there, a negotiated revolution seeks to answer previous injustice through restorative as opposed to punitive justice. Tunisia, arguably the most successful state post revolution, largely followed this model.

I’m sure some readers are rolling their eyes at a college student’s naivety, but change is coming. One must look no further than the recent protest in Saudi Arabia to see that even the most repressive regimes are being forced into concessions. Change is coming. The only question remains how soon and how painful it will be.

Sofia Smith

Saudi Residency Deadline Draws Near

Next week, Saudi Arabia’s Ministry of Labor will begin a rigorous inspection process to punish those violating residency and work visas reports Al Arab news. After a three-month extension of the naturalization deadline, many business owners and government officials say there has been more than enough time to renew visas. However, foreign workers complain that the process is more difficult and time consuming than popularly believed and employers are taking advantage of their weak position to lower wages and reduce benefits.

A deputy minister of labor made clear that the government would take this inspection seriously, “We have complete checklists. We will pursue organizations that either allow their workers to work for third parties, or those who allow workers to be self-employed. We will also check cases of false Saudization and we will check if men are still working in women’s stores. We will also check various sectors, such as construction, maintenance, operations, wholesale and retail, hospitality and catering, commercial and industrial”.

This move by the Saudi Government is the latest in a series of efforts in the ‘Saudiazation’ of the economy.  Non Saudis make up 90% of the private sector work force, and personal remittances have been risen to nearly 30billion US dollars in 2010. To remedy this, the government has developed a color-coded system to rank and either reward or punish businesses based on the percentage of Saudi nationals in their work force. For decades, the Saudi government has been making efforts to increase the role of Saudis in their own economy. However, various education and employment programs have been largely ineffective due to the culture surrounding employment.

Unemployment of Saudi nationals is a major concern for the Saudi economy, and the success of programs like those going into effect on November 3 will be integral to the regime’s long-term survival. In the past, similar programs have had minimum effect. If this one is to be different, government action must coincide with improved educational outcomes and a culture shift in the way young Saudis perceive employment. Despite strong government rhetoric the strictness of the inspection and long-term adherence to this wave of ‘Saudiazation’ remains to be seen.

Sofia Smith

Is Saudi Arabia the Next Regional Powerhouse?

In a recent article for Al-Monitor, Nawaf Obaid wrote that Saudi Arabia had begun a new era of activist foreign policy. He claimed that Saudi refusal to speak at the UNGA in September as well as rejection of a Security Council seat marked a shift in Saudi policy. Citing the regimes ‘successful’ intervention in both Yemen and Bahrain, Obaid says that Saudi Arabia will soon become a regional powerhouse. As Madawi Al-Rasheed argues, Yemen and Bahrain are nowhere near stable and rather than establishing a lasting solution Saudi intervention has simply exacerbated these conflicts. If these are to be the examples of Saudi’s leadership capabilities, they leave much to be desired.

What Obaid seems to miss is that Saudi leadership in the region is something that no popular movements in the region desire. Frightened as people may be of what is happening in Egypt or Syria, the alternative of an authoritarian, Saudi-like model surely is not what they want either. The uprisings that began in 2010 marked a true change in the consciousness of the people of the Middle East, no longer will they stand for heavy-handed authoritarianism. To advocate for Saudi leadership is to ignore this fundamental shift.

Saudi Arabia’s political capital stems from its economic power, yet it is widely known that this is on the decline. Although reliable numbers are hard to come by, estimates of youth unemployment reach around 30%, overall unemployment at around 10.5%. This is even more troubling, considering the labor force participation rate is only 34%, about half of the global average, not to mention that non-Saudis, who make up roughly 90% of the private sector work force, are included in these numbers. One glance at the youth bulge shows that these problems are only going to get worse unless there is serious economic restructuring.  Successfully revamping their economy will require educational and cultural shifts and will also bring with it domestic political challenges as well. The bottom line is that Saudi Arabia has more than enough on its plate without trying to fix the region’s problems as well.

Regional intervention may appear in the short run a good distraction for the Saudis. By shaping regional events through cash and military strength, the way they have always ruled their country, the Saudis hope to create a forced stability and increase their control on their own people as well as the region itself. If it were possible to coerce the people of the Middle East to abandon their chance at political freedom, which is doubtful, it would require a bottomless pocket, which the Saudis no longer possess.

Sofia Smith